Voluntary environmental governance arrangements (VEGAs) 
Introduction
Voluntary environmental governance arrangements (VEGAs) aim to address undesirable outcomes in society through collectively agreed rules, but without the force of law. VEGAs are a broad range of governance arrangements characterized by 'a move away from traditional state-led regimes; the involvement of public and private sector stakeholders in rule making and rule implementation; more collaborative policy processes; and, governance instruments that are less rigid, less prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes, foster experimentation, and are less hierarchical in nature' (Van der Heijden, 2012, 486-87) . The debate on VEGAs has a long history and covers much ground (for recent reviews of the literature, see Potoski, 2011; Van der Heijden, 2012) .
Two major issues stand out in the current literature. First, research reports an ongoing use of VEGAs, and on normative grounds speaks positively of their potential in terms effectiveness and efficiency (Hoffmann, 2011; Koehler, 2007) . Following this literature, it may be concluded that, at least on the short term, VEGAs are a political reality and are likely to mushroom even further in different countries and sectors (however, see counterclaims in Toller, 2008) . Second, empirical studies find that individual VEGAs achieve, at best, moderate success in improving the environmental performance of their participants (for reviews, see Darnall and Sides, 2008; Khanna and Brouhle, 2009; Lyon and Maxwell, 2007; Morgenstern and Pizer, 2007 ). Yet, these latter studies may be criticised for excluding interaction effects between VEGAs and environmental legislation (e.g. Trubek and Trubek, 2007) , for excluding positive spill-over effects of VEGAs from participants to non-participants (e.g. Reid and Toffel, 2009) , and for downplaying the value of VEGAs as policy experiments (e.g. Hoffmann, 2011) . This is partly a consequence of the tendency in the literature to study individual VEGAs in isolation from the larger institutional settings they are embedded in (Van der Heijden, 2012) .
In short, much remains to be done in terms of mapping the role of VEGAs in larger systems of environmental governance. This paper attempts to take up a small part of this huge challenge by examining the development and implementation of a range of VEGAs in the Australian building sector (here defined as the construction and use of buildings). The paper begins by briefly discussing the backdrop against which these VEGAs have emerged -the requirements of environmental practice in the building sector set by Commonwealth, State and Territory, and local governments. It then introduces the various VEGAs studied and analyses their development and implementation. In line with earlier research, this paper finds that the VEGAs studied have individually achieved, at best, moderate results in terms of buildings built (or retrofitted) with high levels of environmental performance. Yet, in implementation they are found to have added to a changed norm towards environmental performance in the sector. Further, through these VEGAs, business cases are developed, which are of importance to convince laggards in the sector to make a move to higher levels of environmental performance. Finally, the VEGAs studied are considered important to fill in the voids left open by governmental requirements, and to facilitate the sector in meeting governmental requirements. The paper concludes with these main lessons learnt.
Environmental governance in the Australian building sector
The typical characteristics of the building sector make the environmental problems it faces severely complex: (i) the environmental harms of the sector spread out and relate to other sectors -such as transport and industry; (ii) buildings often have a long life span, which implies that their environmental impact lasts for decades -or are only considered problematic long after the building is erected; (iii) the sector is highly fragmented, with a wide range of professionals, suppliers, consumers, and financiers involved; (iv) the assumed causes of and solutions to the harms are an interplay of technology and behaviour; and (v) there are high economic interests at stake and strong lobby groups at play, which often makes it hard for policy makers to introduce costly requirements that aim to improve the environmental performance of the sector (here, this paper provides a snapshot of the problems; for good reviews on 'greening' the building sector, see Abaire, 2008; Hoffman and Henn, 2009 ). This is not to say that these problems cannot be addressed by traditional government intervention; indeed, various levels of Australian government have aimed to do so.
Commonwealth government
With the passing of the Clean Energy Act in 2012, the Australian Commonwealth government has sent a clear message regarding their ambitions in addressing climate change. The Act states the need for an overall 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, compared to the levels in 2000 (Australian Parliament, 2011) . One of the most relevant aspects of the Clean Energy Act is the pricing of carbon that is released into the atmosphere -popularly referred to as 'carbon tax'.
Various organizations within the Australian building sector (representing different trades, investors, and property owners) have welcomed this carbon tax, stating that the carbon tax may be a major incentive for the improvement of the environmental performance of the Australian building sector (Allen Consulting Group, 2011; ASBEC, 2008; CIE, 2011; GBCA, 2011 ). Yet, this carbon tax only works indirectly in the building sector. It does not mandate builders, building owners, or investors to achieve certain results in terms of high levels of environmental performance of buildings, or how to achieve such results. However, such requirements also exist. 
State/Territory and local governments
State and Territory governments also aim to manage the environmental performance of the building sector within their jurisdictions. These governments can stipulate the environmental performance of (future) buildings on a particular site, the density of development, or set limits to the spread of urban regions (Thompson, 2007) . Further, the Commonwealth government has required all State and Territory governments to prepare overarching strategic plans for their capital cities to ensure a clear set of short-term, mid-term, and long-term objectives. This has resulted in a range of highly ambitious City plans that provide clarity to both (private sector) investors and the public on how public funds will be spent (COAG, 2012) . These City plans test the boundaries in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the part the building sector plays in achieving this objective. They are of interest because they set significantly higher goals than the Commonwealth policies, aim to achieve these goals on shorter terms, and provide space for experimentation and innovation in doing so. For instance, the City of Sydney aims to reduce greenhouse gasses by characteristic of these plans is that they were developed in close collaboration with business and citizen participation. These deliberative city planning processes fit a larger tendency described in the city planning literature (e.g. Evans, Joas, Sundback, and Thobald, 2005 ).
Critical studies
Despite the above discussion, it is often considered that the Commonwealth government's involvement is too limited to truly address the real problems faced in the Australian building sector. From 2000 onwards, a series of studies has been undertaken to gain a better understanding of the key-issues in the sector that need attention in addressing environmental risks (for an overview, see Bond, 2011) . Two conclusions recur (AGO, 2006; Johanson, 2011; Maller and Horne, 2011) : (i) existing policies, legislative requirements, and regulations do not pay enough attention to potential improvements in the environmental performance of the residential sector, and (ii) they do not pay enough attention to the existing building stock.
Further, the initiatives on the regional and local levels also face severe critique (e.g. COAG, 2012; EDO, 2010; Thomas, 2010 VEGAs is studied in the Australian building sector.
Research design
The research presented largely builds on a stratified sample of fifteen VEGAs, which canvases the type and content of these arrangements in the Australian building sector. In order to understand the development process of the VEGAs, their particular form, and the role they play in environmental governance in this sector, a series of in-depth face-to-face interviews was carried out. Interviewees were indentified using snowball sampling and selected for their in-depth understanding of one or more VEGAs. This sampling resulted in 53 interviewees from various backgrounds -i.e., policy makers, administrators, investors, developers, architects, engineers, and property owners. It should be noted that that the interviewees were often aware of and involved in more than one arrangement. It is expected that this (partly) helps to overcome a sampling bias of arrangement administrators who are overly enthusiastic about their 'own' arrangement. Interestingly, many of these administrators were critical of the arrangements in which they were involved. Table 1 provides insight into the background of these interviewees.
**** TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE***
Interviews were based on a semi-structured questionnaire which provided a structure of checks and balances to assess the validity of findings (see appendix A).
Interviews were recorded and transcribed into a report that was sent back to interviewees for validation. The data were processed by means of a systematic coding scheme based on a large review of the VEGA literature (Van der Heijden, 2012; see appendix B), and qualitative data analysis software was used for an analysis of the data -the program Atlas.ti. By using this approach, the data were systematically explored and insight was gained into the 'repetitiveness' and 'rarity' of experiences shared by the interviewees. Finally, a document study of existing information on these fifteen VEGAs and existing research on VEGAs was carried out to cross-check the validity of the data and findings (methodology based on Seale, Gobo, Gubrium, and Silverman, 2004) .
The following provides a broad overview before focusing on the details: the disparate VEGAs address different aspects of the larger complex environmental problem that the building sector poses. They have unpacked this larger problem into smaller and more manageable problems, and specific problem owners have come together to solve these. Table 2 provides an overview of the VEGAs studied.
*** TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ***
Addressing first-mover disadvantages
Traditional direct government involvement may be critiqued for only aiming to bring laggards up to the required standards (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2002) . Leadership is needed to experiment with new approaches in addressing environmental problems, which may ultimately become the new norm or benchmark. First-mover disadvantages may, however, stand in the way of actors' opportunity to show leadership. First-mover disadvantages relate to the financial, legislative, and cultural risks organizations face when bringing a new product or service to the market (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) . That is, the new product or service may be considered too expensive by clients, it may conflict with existing legislation, or it may face resistance when it is considered 'ahead of its time', or 'too fast for the market' (Robinson and Min, 2002) .
Three types of VEGAs in the Australian building sector address such firstmover disadvantages: best-performance grants, intensive regulatory support, and best-of class benchmarking.
Best-performance grants
Addressing first-mover disadvantages through subsidies is a well-known tool in environmental governance (e.g. Stewart, 2006) ; for instance, the provision of subsidies to households and firms for the instalment of solar panels. Yet, questions have arisen as to how successful traditional subsidies are in improving environmental performance, and sometimes it is even argued that subsidies may be harmful in doing so (Pearce, Porter, Steenblik, Pieters, and Potier, 2003) . To address these problems and aim to make recipients of financial support to move beyond mere bottom-line compliance with the financial arrangements' rules (e.g., merely installing solar panels), a range of Australian governments have introduced best-performance grants. Best-performance grants challenge recipients to come up with innovative solutions to achieve high environmental performance of their (future) buildings. Competition among the grant-applicants is expected to raise the bar of these solutions. 
Intensive regulatory support
Besides providing funds to limit or take away first-mover financial risks, governments may support first-movers by removing legislative barriers (Frynas, Mellhali, and Pigman, 2006) . The building sector is notorious for legislative barriers that hamper improved environmental performance (cf. Bond, 2011) ; for instance, with current technologies it is possible to reclaim and reuse wastewater; however, sewage and drinking-water regulations often prevent this technology from being implemented (e.g. Power, 2010) .
Through intensive regulatory support, the Queensland Government provides regulatory relief to applicants of development proposals that aim to be leaders in terms of environmental performance. The Queensland Government works collaboratively with the development industry, local governments, and referral agencies to identify the most sustainable development proposals in Queensland and helps these organizations to overcome regulatory barriers. Under this VEGA, development proposals that are identified as 'the most sustainable in Queensland'
are fast-tracked in order to ensure that 'exemplary sustainable developments [are] delivered sooner throughout Queensland' (Queensland Government, 2011, 4) . Or, in the words of a representative of a property and development interest group:
It was an acknowledgement that if they [the government] want to reach a certain state of outcomes, they need to make it easier for the people to go through the system (Urban Development Institute of Australia, 2/2/2012 #31).
Reducing or taking away legal barriers in building permitting may be considered a promising approach to support leaders in the industry (also, Decker, 2003) .
However, interviewees questioned the effectiveness of this approach in terms of achieving a large number of buildings constructed. That is, the majority of developers and constructors were said to consider building regulations as the lowest common denominator to meet, and not as something to voluntarily move beyond (also, Van der Heijden, 2009).
Best-of-class benchmarking
Again, another way of overcoming first-mover disadvantages is through information supply, and this is what best-of-class benchmarking aims to achieve. VEGAs fitting this type allow for the comparison of buildings against each other based on their environmental performance. These arrangements rate the environmental performance of buildings on a certain scale -e.g., the number of stars indicates a certain performance. Criteria against which buildings are assessed are set by the arrangement's administrator, and assessment is generally carried out by a third party certifier. In order to meet a particular level of certification, a building must meet a number of criteria. The more criteria are met, the higher the level of certification.
Generally the building owner or designer is left to choose a certain mix of criteria to meet and reach a particular level of certification (e.g. Cooper and Symes, 2009 
Addressing split incentives
Another particular problem in the building sector is split incentives (cf. Abaire, 2008; Hoffman and Henn, 2009 ). The costs of environmental underperformance (electricity, heating, water use, etc.) often come to building users, therefore developers and owners often do not see a need to improve the environmental performance of buildings as they do not bear the costs of underperformance. The VEGAs studied address these split incentives by financially supporting building owners in improving the environmental performance of their (future) buildings, and by supporting building users in achieving such improvements in the buildings they lease.
Tripartite financing
Property owners often cannot find the necessary financing to upgrade their buildings.
Banks are risk averse in supplying mortgages as the cost of the upgrade is not (yet)
represented in an increase in the building's market value (cf. Pivo, 2010).
To address this particular issue, the cities of Melbourne and Sydney have introduced VEGAs based on tripartite financing. In both cities, the particular arrangements are founded in their overall city planning strategy, as described above.
The arrangements address the specific financing problem, but also provide a strong tool for governments to achieve results. As an administrator explained: These VEGAs bring together local councils, a national bank, a major fund manager, the Australian Carbon Trust, and property owners in the cities' central business districts. The VEGA is a vehicle to allow the local councils to enter into agreements with building owners and finance providers as a way of funding works to improve the environmental performance of those buildings. Under these VEGAs, the finance provider lends funds to a building owner for environmental upgrades to its buildings, and this loan is repaid through a local council charge on the land -i.e., the local council charges a fee, which is then used to pay off the loan. The agreement states the future environmental performance that is to be achieved, and stipulates a time frame for achieving this result (NSW Government, 2010) .
Information networks
Tenants are often unaware as to how to improve their environmental performance.
CitySwitch Green Office, implemented throughout Australia, addresses this issue.
The VEGA aims to make tenants aware of the energy they use and how they can reduce this. It is administrated by local councils and state governments and serves as a platform for office tenants to learn about energy efficiency, share information, network, and showcase good practices. It further helps tenants to put pressure on their landlords to improve the environmental performance of their buildings.
In participating in the arrangement, office tenants come to agreements with councils on their future environmental performance, and the council then provides support to help them to meet these goals. Certain councils provide financial support; others facilitate meetings and ensure an ongoing supply and distribution of information. 3 In return for signing off an agreement with a local council on future targets to be met, participants may use the promotional CitySwitch Green Office logo, and early awards have been introduced to recognize leading practice. 4 The ability to showcase leadership is considered a strong driver for participation:
It is about leadership, it is about being seen to participate. … The program helps leaders to feel good about what it is they are doing, and to have a place to speak about it (Sydney City Council, 15/2/2012 #41).
Elite networks
In achieving a high overall environmental performance of the building sector, it is important to move beyond the level of individual buildings. In particular, the interaction of infrastructure such as water and electricity supply, sewage and waste collection, and transport of people and goods to and from buildings has a significant impact on the environmental performance of buildings. When making investments in future infrastructure, cities may wish to know whether building owners and developers are willing to move to higher performing buildings, and if so, the necessary requirements for them to do so. Building owners may wish to be informed on the direction a city may take in its infrastructure investments and legislative framework before making investments to improve their buildings' environmental performance. That is, for property owners it is important to have certainty about a city's future policies as these will strong impact on the value of their building portfolio and future investment decisions.
For governments, the most direct way of engaging with businesses is by bringing them together to start a debate. This is what the Better Buildings
Partnership aims to achieve. The underlying assumption of such collaborative approaches is that participants will be more willing to comply with an agreement made, as opposed to operating under a traditional top-down regulatory approach. This is because they have been involved in the design of the arrangement and as such are, or at least may feel responsible for, its outcomes (cf., Schot and Holder, 2006 property owners have the ability to make major improvements to their individual buildings, they and the City of Sydney can achieve greater results if they collaborate.
As an administrator of the Partnership explained:
[T]here is only so much they can do with their own portfolio and their The Partnership builds on a Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the various parties, stating that the property owners commit to the City's vision (the earlier discussed Sydney City plan) and the city will support them in doing so. Being involved in the policy making process, public recognition and peer-pressure appear strong drivers for property owners to join and participate. A representative of one of the participating landlords highlighted the reason for their involvement:
The value for us is in being at the table with our competitors and peers. 
Addressing residential buildings
A final particular problem addressed in the series of VEGAs studied is the difficulty of improving the environmental performance of residential buildings. Two specific issues stand in the way for doing so. First, existing property rights mean that many existing buildings, in particular residential buildings, do not have to meet new and more stringent environmental regulations (ABCB, 2011). Second, changing the environmental behaviour of households (as users of residential buildings) is hampered by their awareness of the environmental problems faced and their willingness and ability to change their behaviour (Berglund and Matti, 2006) . This challenge is strengthened as the information available on both the environmental problems faced and the possibilities for change is highly complex (Hoffman and Henn, 2009 ). An obvious and oft chosen approach to increase the knowledge of households on environmental problems is information campaigns (Stewart, 2006) .
However, such campaigns are often found to have a limited effect (Henry and Gordon, 2003) .
Intensive behavioural interventions 6
In order to overcome the limitations of one-way information supply, a series of VEGAs aim to make households aware of their behaviour and environmental performance, and to provide them with tools for improvement. Generally, a consultant visits a household and audits the household's environmental performance (e.g., based on their energy and water bills). Following the audit, the consultant advises the household as to how it can improve its environmental performance and supplies the household with actual means to do so. Interviewees were critical regarding the impact of the VEGAs in terms of numbers of buildings built or retrofitted (n=31, 58%). Nevertheless, they speak positively about the VEGAs' impact on the building sector.
Changing the norm
There is consensus amongst the interviewees that these VEGAs have achieved more than 'just' a number of buildings with a high level of environmental 
The limits of VEGAs
Whilst this group was positive about the role VEGAs have played in changing the norm in the Australian building sector, another group of interviewees was critical regarding what it is VEGAs may achieve. There was a shared perception among these interviewees that VEGAs are insufficient in addressing those areas in the building sector where a business case for higher levels of environmental performance is absent. Here, interviewees argued that government intervention through regulation may be needed (n=30, 57%):
The speed in which we react is out of sync with the problems we face.
Although a lot of voluntary programs make sense, they are not fast enough in addressing problems. Regulation is needed. Yes, there is much change to be seen over the last ten years, but change has only occurred in the top-end of the construction market (Australian Green Development Forum, 1/2/2012 #29).
Mandatory is the way to go. And that probably is a funny answer from somebody who runs a voluntary program. Well, there probably is room for both. But if we make the changes in the timeline we need to make them, then we've got to toughen up here (Sydney City Council, 15/2/2012 #41).
There was a recognition that … that industry could only go so far …
We operate in an environment where the market drives a lot of things, but in certain areas there needs to be government intervention, or government regulation, or government participation in order to push or progress the agenda to the point where it needs to move to (Australian Sustainable Built Environment Council, 16/11/2011 #21).
That is not to say that interviewees hold that future regulation should replace VEGAs. Interviewees shared the opinion that direct governmental regulation may improve the uptake and success of VEGAs. Subsequently, on their turn, VEGAs may assist in meeting governmental requirements. For instance, the recently implemented 'carbon tax' (see section 2.1) was considered to be a driver for an increased uptake of the discussed VEGAs:
Obviously, being involved in [a VEGA] isn't mandatory but with carbon pricing, it's becoming more important for businesses to prioritize energy efficiency (Brisbane City Council, 2/2/2012 #30).
The thing that is starting now, and that will make a difference is the cost of energy … People will start looking for ways to reduce costs and 
Conclusion
This brief research article studied the emergence and implementation of a range of Second, the VEGAs help to timely fill in voids in formal legislative requirements. In the Australian building sector, severe shortfalls in the legislative requirements relate to a lack of attention to existing buildings and a lack of attention to residential buildings. Many of the VEGAs studied particularly aim to address these issues. As opposed to formal legislative requirements, VEGAs may face shorter development time, or are less costly to develop as they remain outside the realm of formal administrative processes and procedures (cf. Lyon and Maxwell, 2007 (Scott and Holder, 2006) .
Third, the VEGAs studied play a strong role in generating business cases.
Where traditional steering tools (i.e., direct regulation, subsidies) leave it to policy makers to set levels of environmental performance, the various VEGAs discussed often leave it to the participants to show improved levels of performance. In particular, best-performance grants and intensive regulatory support appear to be tools that challenge participants to make significant advances in terms of innovation concerning cost-effective improvements of environmental performance.
Fourth and finally, the VEGAs studied were considered to fulfil a facilitative role in meeting governmental requirements. In the case of carbon pricing in particular, it is left to individuals and organizations to reduce their carbon emissions (or pay for emitting). VEGAs here may provide 'evidence based' approaches for doing so.
To conclude, VEGAs are often considered as an experimental form of governance (e.g. Hoffmann, 2011) . Experiments are about trial and error. As such we may learn valuable lessons from VEGAs: some may prove successful, whilst others do not. This study once more showed that VEGAs do not provide a universal solution to eliminating environmental risks. Yet, as this study indicated, it is too black-and-white to state that without high levels of environmental performance
VEGAs have no merit. By undertaking subtle roles, they may help to build the critical mass that will ultimately achieve the necessary change towards high levels of environmental performance in a sector. This implies that governments and nongovernmental individuals and organizations need to think carefully when considering
VEGAs as an alternative approach to govern environmental risks. As this article has made clear, governments may have much to gain when regulated actors collaborate with them to achieve far reaching goals in terms of environmental sustainability (i.e., the city plans drawn up by the major Australian cities). Thus, showing flexibility through collaboration with regulated actors makes sense for governments. However, it remains a question why regulated actors would collaborate with governments. As this article has made clear, it seems that in the cases studied such participation was mostly found when a VEGA clearly addresses the interest of its non-governmental participants. Thus, one of the major critical questions for further research to address is whether and how VEGAs can be successful if their non-governmental participants lack a clear interest. I will address this question in the research that follows from the study presented here, and I also challenge my colleagues to take up this question. 
